UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-17-2014

Lopez v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40751

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Lopez v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40751" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4577.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4577

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ERNESTO GARZA LOPEZ,
Petitioner!Appellant,

)
)
)

)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

S.Ct. No. 40751
Case No. CV-2012-2895-C
(Canyon County)

)

Respondent.

)

REPL Y BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the Third
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho
In and For the County of Canyon

HONORABLE JAMES C. MORFlTT
District Judge

Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Table of Authorities ....................................................

II.

Argument in Reply ...................................................... 1
A.

B.

III.

11

The District Court Erred by Striking Mr. Lopez's Pro Se Motion Instead of
Addressing His Requests for New Counselor to Proceed Pro Se and Additional
Time to Respond to the Court's Notice ofIntent to Dismiss ................. 1
1.

Mr. Lopez's motion and affidavit are directed towards counsel's non
perfonnance and fall within the exception requiring courts to consider
pro se pleadings filed by represented litigants ...................... 3

2.

The district court granted Mr. Lopez's motion for appointment of counsel
but no attorney had appeared in the case .......................... 4

3.

The interests of justice and due process require considering pro se
pleadings in circumstances such as those at bar .................... 6

The District Court's Error in Striking the Motion Affected His Substantial Rights
and Requires Remand for Appointment of Counsel and an Opportunity to
Respond to the District Court's Notice ................................. 8

Conclusion

............................................................ 9

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ................................................................................... 7

STATE CASES
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 924 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................... 7
In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106 (Cal. 2003) ....................................................................................... 1
Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010) ........................................................................ 8
Graves v. State, 642 So. 2d 142 (Fla. App. 1994) ................................................................ 6, 7,8
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999) ............................................... 7
Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987) ................................................... 7
People v. Milton, 820 N.E.2d 1074 (Ill. App. 2004) ..................................................................... 1
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................................. 7
State v. Graddick, 548 S.E.2d 210 (S.C. 2001) ............................................................................ 1
Whiting v. State, 929 So. 2d 673 (Fla. App. 2006) ....................................................................... 1

STATE STATUTES
I.C. § 19-4908 .............................................................................................................................. 7

11

II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred by Striking Mr. Lopez's Pro Se Motion Instead of
Addressing His Requests for New Counselor to Proceed Pro Se and Additional
Time to Respond to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Approximately twenty-three days after the district court issued a notice of intent to

dismiss that provided Mr. Lopez twenty days to respond, the district court received a pro se
document from Mr. Lopez titled "Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Notice of
Intent to Dismiss Application for Post-Conviction Relief." CR (40751) 29-31, 35-42, 44-48. In
a supporting affidavit, Mr. Lopez explained that no attorney had communicated with him
regarding the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, that he would request substitute counsel
and that equitable concerns dictated that he be allowed an opportunity to respond to the district
court's notice. Id. at p. 44-45. In the motion, Mr. Lopez asked for additional time to respond to
the notice of intent to dismiss "pro se" as a result of "court appointed counsel's shortcomings."
Id. at p. 47-50. Although the district court found that "appointed counsel had taken no action to

address the Court's Notice ofIntent to Dismiss," it nonetheless simultaneously ordered the pro se
motion stricken because Mr. Lopez was represented by counsel and dismissed the petition
because thirty-one days had elapsed since the district court issued its notice of intent to dismiss.
Id. at p. 50.

Pro se pleadings filed while a party is represented, which include requests to discharge
counselor complaints directed towards counsel's performance, are a critical exception to the
general rule allowing courts to treat such pro se pleadings as a nullity. See In re Barnett, 73 P.3d
1106, 1110 (Cal. 2003); Whiting v. State, 929 So.2d 673, 674-75 (Fla. App. 2006); People v.
Milton, 820 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (Ill. App. 2004); State v. Graddick, 548 S.E.2d 210, 211 (S.C.

2001).1 Mr. Lopez's request for additional time to respond to the district court's notice of intent

to dismiss informed the district court that no attorney had communicated with him regarding the
notice and that he wished to either respond pro se or to seek appointment of substitute counsel.
Because the motion and affidavit were directed towards counsel's nonperformance - and that
nonperformance was corroborated by the fact no attorney had appeared in the case or responded
to the notice of intent to dismiss - the district court abused its discretion in striking Mr. Lopez's
motion.
In arguing to the contrary, the state notes that Mr. Lopez's motion requested additional

time to respond to the district court's notice and then argues that requests for extension oftime
do not fall within the exception to the court's ability to strike pro se pleadings filed while a party
is represented. The state further contends that Mr. Lopez was represented by an attorney because
the district court had issued an order appointing counsel even if no attorney had actually appeared
in the case. Finally, the state suggests that the exception regarding pro se pleadings directed at
counsel's performance should not apply at all because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
does not guarantee the effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
Mr. Lopez's motion requested additional time to respond pro se because of counsel's non
performance. Thus, the circumstances fall squarely within the exception to the rule allowing pro

1 The state contends that I.R.C.P. II(a) allows the court to strike a pleading signed by the
litigant when that litigant is represented. Respondent's Brief, p. 8-10. Even if the state is
correct, Rule 11(a) permits the court to strike the pleading only when "a pleading, motion or
other paper is not signed ... promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader
or movant." (emphasis added). Here, the district court struck Mr. Lopez's motion without
providing an opportunity to cure any defect. Regardless of whether Rule 11 (a) supported the
district court's action, it appears that the issue is appropriately considered as one of inherent
discretion as set forth in the multiple extra-jurisdictional opinions cited by both parties.
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se pleadings to be stricken when a party is represented. Further, although the district court
ordered the appointment of counsel, no attorney had entered an appearance, filed any documents
or communicated with Mr. Lopez. Refusing to consider Mr. Lopez's complaint regarding
counsel's lack of performance and then dismissing the action based on that same non
performance deprived Mr. Lopez of his statutory right to counsel and his due process right to a
meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. Accordingly, the district court
abused it discretion in striking Mr. Lopez's motion and the case must be remanded for
appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss.

1.

Mr. Lopez's motion and affidavit are directed towards counsel's non
performance and fall within the exception requiring courts to consider pro se
pleadings filed by represented litigants

Mr. Lopez informed the district court that no attorney had communicated with him about
or responded to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. He thus requested additional time to
respond "pro se" and indicated he would request substitute counsel. According to the state, Mr.
Lopez asked for "additional time to file a pro se response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss
while still represented by counsel" and because "the motion was a request for additional time, not
a request to discharge counsel ... the district court acted within its discretion in declining to
consider it." Respondent's Brief, p. 12-13 (emphasis in original).
The state's conclusion that Mr. Lopez asked for additional time to respond pro se while
still represented, as opposed to representing himself in the action, appears to be predicated on the
absence of explicit language asking the court to "discharge" counsel. Such a conclusion cannot
be drawn from Mr. Lopez's motion and affidavit. To the contrary, Mr. Lopez asked for time to
respond pro se and to seek substitute counsel, suggesting he wished to be represented by
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competent counsel. Particularly in light of Mr. Lopez's status as an inmate without legal
training, the absence of an explicit request to "discharge" counsel cannot be used to conclude that
he must have desired hybrid representation rather than to proceed on his own or to have another
attorney appointed.
On the other hand, the motion and affidavit do clearly indicate that Mr. Lopez had not
heard from his attorney regarding the district court's notice and that he wished to have an
opportunity to respond. Even if not an explicit request to proceed pro se, the motion and
affidavit clearly were directed at counsel's performance. Indeed, because no attorney had
addressed the deadline to respond to the notice, Mr. Lopez reasonably perceived the first order of
business as addressing the deadline and the second order of business as seeking substitute
counsel.
The reasoning underlying the exception discussed in the various cases cited in Mr.
Lopez's Opening Brief applies fully in these circumstances. Mr. Lopez's motion and affidavit
based his request for additional time on counsel's ineffective (or non existence) assistance.
Accordingly, the district court was obligated to address Mr. Lopez's request even though counsel
had been appointed.
2.

The district court granted Mr. Lopez's motion for appointment of counsel
but no attorney had appeared in the case

As Mr. Lopez noted in his Opening Brief, no attorney had filed a notice of appearance or
any other document in the case at the time the action was summarily dismissed. While the
certificate of service on the district court's orders reflects that Mark Mimura (the Canyon County
Public Defender) had been appointed, the record reveals that Mimura's office represented Mr.
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Lopez in the initial post-conviction proceedings. Compare CR (37206) p. 120 (Mimura Law)
with CR (40751) p. 34 (Mimura Law). Thus, Mimura's office could not represent Mr. Lopez on

his claim that he was entitled to proceed with a successive petition due to ineffective assistance
of counsel in those initial proceedings. In response, the state argues that Mr. Lopez is
challenging the district court's factual finding that he was represented. Respondent's Brief, p.
13-14. The state further asserts that the absence of any documents being filed on Mr. Lopez's
behalf does not establish that he was unrepresented and that Mr. Lopez's contrary assertions are
bare speculation.
The district court's order granting Mr. Lopez's request for counsel provides that the
"Canyon County Public Defenders Office, or, if necessary, conflict counsel" was appointed to
represent Mr. Lopez. R. 33. The register of actions reflects that no attorney filed an appearance
or any other documents before the action was dismissed. R. 1. As noted, it would have been
necessary to assign conflict counsel as provided for in the district court's order. Thus, while Mr.
Lopez does not challenge the district court's finding that an order appointing counsel had been
issued, the record also establishes that no attorney had appeared in the case or taken any action
with respect to the notice of intent to dismiss. While Mr. Lopez postulated that no attorney had
yet entered an appearance given the proximity of the district court's order appointing counsel and
its notice ofintent to dismiss,2 it is also possible that the order appointing counsel was never

2 Counsel notes that in a recent Canyon County successive post-conviction action, thirtyone days elapsed between the district court's initial order appointing counsel and the order
naming the conflict attorney assigned to represent the petitioner in the case. See Register of
Actions, Jimenez v. State, Canyon County Case No. CV-2013-0004753-C. Here, thirty-seven
days elapsed between the order appointing counsel and the order summarily dismissing the
action. Thus, although undersigned counsel has speculated as to the precise reason no attorney
appeared on Mr. Lopez's behalf before his petition was dismissed, that speculation is consistent
5

received by the public defender's office or that the office simply failed to comply with the order.
Whatever the reason, no attorney had appeared on Mr. Lopez's behalf when the action was
dismissed.
In the end, it is unnecessary to determine whether a party is truly represented when the
court has ordered that counsel be appointed but no attorney has appeared in the case. The district
court issued a notice of intent to dismiss within days of granting Mr. Lopez's request for counsel,
refused to consider Mr. Lopez's pleas to provide additional time since no attorney had contacted
him regarding the notice and then dismissed the action notwithstanding Mr. Lopez's
representations and the absence of any attorney's appearance on Mr. Lopez's behalf. Because the
district court's decisions were not reached through an exercise of reason and were profoundly
unfair, it abused its discretion in dismissing Mr. Lopez's successive petition without addressing
his request for additional time.
3.

The interest of justice and due process require considering pro se pleadings
in circumstances such as those at bar

The Florida appellate court described the difficulty in refusing to consider pro se requests
regarding counsel's performance as follows:
In the first place, if the claim is that the appointed lawyer is not doing the lawyer's
assigned job, one might wonder how that failure would ever come to light and be
appropriately remedied if the person who is suffering from this inadequacy is not
permitted to do so. Simply ignoring a pretrial assertion of ineffectiveness of
counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in post conviction relief
proceedings.

Graves v. State, 642 So.2d 142, 144 (Fla. App. 1994). According to the state, "Graves is
inapposite ... because in that case the defendant actually filed a pro se motion to discharge his

with the practice in Canyon County.
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appointed attorney on the basis that the attorney had been" noncommunicative and because the

Graves defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel whereas Mr. Lopez does not.
Respondent's Brief, p. 14-15. Initially, as explained above, that Mr. Lopez asked for time to
respond to the district court's notice "pro se" because no attorney had either contacted him or
responded to the notice, rather than explicitly indicate he wished to "discharge" counsel, is a
distinction without a difference.
Moreover, while Mr. Lopez does not have a Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, he does have a due process right to a
meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. See Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho
186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008), citing Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992
P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"); see also

Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381,385,924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996); Mellinger v. State,
113 Idaho 31, 35, 740 P.2d 73, 77 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., concurring). The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
The right to a meaningful opportunity to present post-conviction claims is protected by a
petitioner's ability to litigate a successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908 when ineffective
assistance of counsel results in those claims being inadequately presented. The right is also
protected by the statutory right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings and the requirement
that a court appoint counsel under that statute when the litigant provides the possibility of a valid
claim. Thus, similar to the reasoning of the Graves Court, "simply ignoring a [post-conviction]
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assertion of ineffectiveness of counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in [successive]
post conviction relief proceedings." Graves, 642 So.2d at 144. The reasoning of the Graves and
other opinions apply equally where the non performing attorney has been appointed to represent a
former criminal defendant in a post-conviction proceedings.
B.

The District Court's Error in Striking the Motion Affected His Substantial Rights
and Requires Remand for Appointment of Counsel and an Opportunity to Respond
to the District Court's Notice
The record establishes that Mr. Lopez could possibly demonstrate sufficient reason for

inadequately presenting his ineffective assistance of counsel's claims during initial postconviction relief proceedings and, thus, that he could litigate those claims in successive
proceedings. Accordingly, the district court's error in simultaneously striking his pro se motion
and dismissing the case affected his substantial rights and the case must be remanded for
appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the district court's notice of intent to
dismiss.
According to the state, Mr. Lopez has not demonstrated that he was entitled to a
continuance and, thus, the district court's abuse of discretion in striking Mr. Lopez's motion did
not violate his substantial rights. Respondent's Brief, p. 16-17. However, Mr. Lopez's
arguments that the district court abused its discretion by striking the motion also establish that it
would be an abuse of discretion to fail to grant additional time to respond to the notice.
Because "the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is 'the exclusive means for
challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence' other than by direct appeal," the interest of
justice can require an exception to the rule that litigants are generally bound by their attorneys'
actions in civil proceedings. See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737, 228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010).
8

No attorney communicated with Mr. Lopez regarding the notice of intent to dismiss, filed an
appearance or responded in any fashion to the notice. Mr. Lopez thus requested additional time
to respond. To refuse to grant additional time in those circumstances would not only deprive Mr.
Lopez of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims, but also be unreasonable and an abuse
of discretion.
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Lopez explained how he was harmed by the district court's
decision to simultaneously strike his motion and dismiss the case because he presented the
possibility of valid claims and was thus entitled to the assistance of counsel. In response to these
arguments, the state simply notes they were not raised below. Respondent's Brief, p. 17.
However, arguments illustrating that the record supports valid claims and that representation is
thus required are, by their nature, not presented in the district court. Because the record
establishes the possibility of valid claims, Mr. Lopez was harmed by the district court's decision
to strike his motion and dismiss the case without an opportunity to respond to the notice of intent
to dismiss. The case should be remanded for appointment of counsel and an opportunity to
respond.

III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Mr. Lopez respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his post-conviction claims and to
remand this case for appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the district court's
notice of intent to dismiss.
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Respectfully submitted this _-'-- day of January 2014.
NEV~,I~:

JAMIN, McKA Y & BARTLETT LLP

//~.

R yn Fyffe
Attorney for Ernesto Garza Lopez
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this t-Jay of August, 2013, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing to bemailedto:O:f:tfcl~ftheAttorneYGeneral.p.O.Box83720.Boise.
ID 83720-0010.
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